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NOTES
INDIANA'S STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR
THE ABUSED CHILD
INTRODUCTION
Children in our society are subjected to a great deal of pushing,
pulling and scolding by those entrusted with their care. Most chil-
dren have been punished physically at least one time in their life.
Carried to its extreme, this pattern of child-rearing produces the
abused child.'
Recognition of the problem of child abuse2 is a relatively recent
phenomenon. The breakthrough in the identification of child abuse
as a major problem of society came in 1962 when Kempe, Silver-
man, Steele, Droegemueller and Silver alerted fellow physicians to
consider it as a potential diagnosis. 3 This pioneering study also in-
1. A degree of violence against children is patterned into the child-rearing philosophies
and practices of nearly all adults. This general attitude with respect to children is discussed
in G. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 7-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GIL]. For historical
treatment of adult violence against children see Radbill, A History of Child Abuse and
Infanticide, in THE BATTERED CHILD 3 (R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1968); Solomon, History
and Demography of Child Abuse, 51 PEDIATRICS 773 (1973).
Child abuse is just a variant form of this parent-child interaction: From early in
infancy the children of abusing parents are expected to show exemplary behavior and
a respectful, submissive, thoughtful attitude toward adult authority and society
.... To be sure, such ideas are extremely prevalent in our culture and are essen-
tially acceptable ideals of child rearing. Parents feel quite justified in following such
principles. The difference between the non-abusing and abusing parent is that the
latter implements such standards with exaggerated intensity, and most importantly,
at an inappropriately early age.
Steele & Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children, in
THE BATTERED CHILD 103, 110 (R. Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1968).
2. For the purpose of this note child abuse is defined simply as the intentional infliction
of physical injury upon children by adults.
3. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, The Battered-Child Syndrome,
181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962). They developed the term "battered child syndrome" and defined it
as "a clinical condition in young children who have received some physical abuse, generally
from a parent or foster parent." Id. at 17. Before 1962, the condition had been referred to in
medical journals as "unrecognized trauma." See, e.g., Silverman, The Roentgen Manifesta-
tions of Unrecognized Skeletal Trauma in Infants, 69 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 413 (1953). The
term "battered child" has been criticized for its connotations of cruelty approaching sadism.
Elmer, Hazards in Determing Child Abuse, 45 CHILD WELFARE 28, 29 (1966). Other terms that
have been suggested as more accurate conceptually include: "maltreatment syndrome in
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cluded some startling findings. Of 302 cases of child abuse reported
in hospitals nationwide, 33 of the children died and 85 suffered
permanent brain injury.4 District attorneys disclosed 447 cases of
abuse in a similar one-year period. Of these, 45 resulted in death
and 29 in permanent brain damage.' An editorial in the same issue
of the Journal of American Medical Association speculated that
child abuse may be a more frequent cause of death in infants than
leukemia, cystic fibrosis and muscular dystrophy!
Each year an increasing number of cases of child abuse come
to the attention of public authorities in Indiana. In 1967 there were
106 reports of abuse received in the state.' The number grew to 125
in 19681 and 273 in 1972.1 An enormous increase was registered in
1973, with 745 reports of abuse received during the year.'" These
increases in reported cases are probably attributable to greater re-
porting rather than to a growing incidence of the problem in the
state."
One vital part of Indiana's machinery for dealing with child
abuse is the law. Indiana provides statutory protection for the
abused child primarily in four ways: (1) a law requiring all persons
to report suspected incidents of child abuse to public authorities; (2)
provisions in the criminal law designed to punish the perpetrator of
the abuse; (3) juvenile law provisions allowing abused children to
be placed under protective supervision or removed from their home;
children," Fontana, Donovan, & Wong, The "Maltreatment Syndrome" in Children, 269 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1389, 1389 (1963); and "child abuse syndrome," Silver, Child Abuse Syndrome:
A Review, 96 MED. TIMES 803, 805 (1968).
4. Kempe, et al., supra note 3, at 17.
5. Id.
6. Editorial, The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 42 (1962). The true incidence
of death resulting from child abuse is obscured by classification of many infant deaths as
accidental. Fontana, Donovan, & Wong, supra note 3, at 1389.
7. GIL, supra note 1, at 93. Gil conducted a survey of every incident of child abuse
reported through legal channels throughout the United States in 1967 and 1968. The survey
was initiated and funded by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.
8. Id.
9. INDIANA STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, BATrERED CHILDREN RECEIVING SERVICE
(1972).
10. INDIANA STATE DEP'T OF PULuc WELFARE, BATTERED CHILDREN RECEIVING SERVICE
(1973).
11. This explanation was offered for increases in reported cases nationwide. See GIL,
supra note 1, at 96.
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ABUSED CHILD
and (4) authorization for a program of child welfare services for
dependent and neglected children through each county department
of public welfare. It is the purpose of this note to discuss each of
these general statutory provisions."
THE REPORTING LAW
Abused children and abusing adults cannot be helped if their
condition remains undetected. As a result, Indiana and all other
states recently enacted legislation requiring the reporting of sus-
pected cases of child abuse to public authorities. 3 These statutes
are designed to provide the state with the first indication that some-
thing is wrong in a particular child's environment. Only then can
the protection and services of the state be invoked to aid in the
resolution of the problem.
Indiana's reporting law,'4 enacted in 1965,' s was patterned
closely after the model statute developed by the Children's Bureau
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare." This first
12. Discussion throughout is hampered by a lack of reported cases in the area. Cases
in juvenile court are not reported and apparently rarely appealed. Criminal prosecution of
the perpetrators of child abuse is infrequent. An Indiana judge with juvenile court duties
encountered the same difficulty in investigating Indiana law on neglected and dependent
children. See Rakestraw, Legal Aspects of Neglect, RES GESTAE, October 1965, at 5.
13. Surveys of all the state reporting laws can be found in Daly, Willful Child Abuse
and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283 (1969); DeFrancis, Child Abuse -
The Legislative Response, 44 DENVER L.J. 3 (1967); McCoid, The Battered Child and Other
Assaults upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1965); Paulsen, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws: The Shape of Legislation, 67 COLUM L. REv. 1 (1967); Comment, The Abused
Child: Problems and Proposals, 8 DUQUESNE L. REv. 136 (1970); Note, The Legal Response
to Child Abuse, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 960 (1970).
Individual state reporting laws are discussed in Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and
Legal Aspects of the Battered Child Syndrome, 50 CI.-KENT L. REv. 45 (1973) (Illinois);
Comment, The California Legislative Approach to Problems of Willful Child Abuse, 54 CAUF.
L. REV. 1805 (1966) (California); Note, The Battered Child - Louisiana's Response to the
Cry, 17 LOYOLA L. REv. 372 (1971) (Louisiana); Note, Parent and Child - Child Beating -
Recent Legislation Requiring Reporting of Physical Abuse, 45 ORE. L. REv. 114 (1966)
(Oregon); Comment, Oregon's Child Abuse Legislation: Some Additional Proposals, 5
WiLLLAMErrE L.J. 131 (1968) (Oregon); 15 DFPAUL L. REv. 453 (1966) (Illinois); 18 U. FLA. L.
REv. 503 (1965) (Florida); 18 WEST. RES. L. REv. 1405 (1967) (Ohio).
For an excellent description of the growing sentiment and lobbying that led to the
enactment of child abuse reporting laws in the states see Paulsen, Parker, & Adelman, Child
Abuse Reporting Laws - Some Legislative History, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1966).
14. INo. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-1426 to -1431 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1 (1973).
15. Ch. 268, §§ 1-7, [1965] Ind. Acts 737 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 170, §§ 1-6, [1971]
Ind. Acts 679).
16. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE ABUSED
1974]
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attempt at child abuse reporting legislation in Indiana was soon
found to be inadequate. In 1971 the law was repealed'7 and replaced
with a substantially different version."
CHILD - PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSI-
CALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963).
For a discussion of the Children's Bureau model statute and other proposed models see
Paulsen, supra note 13.
17. Pub. L. No. 170, §§ 1-6, [1971] Ind. Acts 679 (codified at IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-
1426 to -1431 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1 (1973)).
18. The current reporting law reads as follows:
12-3-4.1-1. Protection of children from abuse-Purpose.-The purpose of this chapter
is to provide protection for children who are cruelly treated by those responsible for
their care and protection.
12-3-4.1-2. County department of public welfare-Report of abuse-Penalty for fail-
ure to report.-(a) It shall be the duty of any person who has reason to believe that
a child has had physical injury inflicted upon him other than by accidental means
by a parent or other person responsible for his care to report such information to the
county department of public welfare or the proper law enforcement agency. Upon
discovery of such injury, a report immediately shall be made providing such informa-
tion, as may be available to the person making such report, including his own identi-
fication. In the event the person making the report is licensed to administer medical
assistance, the report shall also include the nature and extent of the child's injuries
including any evidence of previous injuries, and any other information that such
person believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of the injuries and the
identity of the perpetrator.
(b) Any person who consciously fails to make the report required by subsection
(a) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof may be fined not
more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned for a determinant period not to exceed
thirty days, or both.
12-3-4.1-3. Investigation of report-Determination of probable cause.-(a) Upon re-
ceiving a report required by section 2 of this chapter, the law enforcement agency or
county department of public welfare receiving such report shall immediately cause
an investigation into the facts contained therein and upon completion thereof, if the
facts so warrant, shall submit a written report to the prosecutor in the county where
the injury or injuries were inflicted.
(b) Upon receipt of such report the prosecutor shall determine whether the facts
contained therein constitute probable cause that any act prohibited by IC 1971, 35-
14-1 or as hereafter amended, has been committed.
12-3-4.1-4. Immunity from civil or criminal liability.-Any person, other than a per-
son accused of infliction of physical injury on a child, who makes a report pursuant
to this chapter, or who at a judicial proceeding brought pursuant to this chapter or
IC 1971, 35-14-1 testifies or otherwise produces evidence against a defendant shall
have immunity from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred
or imposed as a result of such report or participation in the judicial proceeding:
Provided, however, That such immunity shall not attach for any person who has
acted maliciously or in bad faith.
12-3-4.1-5. Physician-patient privilege-Husband-wife privilege.-Neither the
physician-patient privilege nor the husband-wife privliege shall be grounds for ex-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 4
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Generally, the current reporting law seeks to facilitate the dis-
covery of child abuse by requiring all persons to report suspected
cases to the county department of public welfare or a law enforce-
ment agency.'9 Failure to report is a misdemeanor." To further en-
courage compliance with the statute, anyone who reports in good
faith is given immunity from civil or criminal liability which might
result from the report." The physician-patient and husband-wife
privileges are abrogated in any judicial proceeding initiated in re-
sponse to a report of abuse. 2
Who Shall Report
Indiana places the duty of reporting incidents of child abuse on
"any person. ' 23 It is one of four states to provide for required univer-
sal reporting. 4 The more usual approach is to require reporting only
of physicians and allied medical personnel, or, in some states, others
who come in contact with children in a professional capacity. 25 Ex-
tension of the reporting duty to all persons was one of the principal
changes effected by the repeal of the 1965 reporting statute."
Commentators do not agree on who should be required to report
incidents of child abuse. Those that argue for limiting the duty to
physicians stress that most cases of child abuse first come to the
attention of physicians, 27 that physicians are particularly qualified
cluding evidence in any judicial proceeding under this chapter and IC 1971, 35-14-1.
12-3-4.1-6. Child competent to testify.-Any child may testify at a judicial proceed-
ing under this chapter 12-3-4.1-1-12-3-4.1-6 and IC 1971, 35-14-1 when such child,
regardless of age, is deemed competent to testify by the court.
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-1426 to -1431 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1 (1973).
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
20. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(b) (1973).
21. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1429 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-3.1-4 (1973).
22. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1430 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-5 (1973).
23. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
24. The three other states that require reporting by all persons are Nebraska, Tennessee
and Utah. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (Supp. 1973);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (Supp. 1973).
25. Comparative charts of the state reporting laws can be found in Comment, The
Abused Child: Problems and Proposals, supra note 13, at 146-47; Note, The Legal Response
to Child Abuse, supra note 13, at 968-81.
26. Under the 1965 reporting law, the duty was limited to physicians, interns, residents,
laboratory technicians, nurses, pharmacists, chiropractors or other persons furnishing medi-
cal aid. Ch. 268, § 1, [1965] Ind. Acts 737.
27. Paulsen, supra note 13, at 3. A commentator that favors universal reporting agrees
with this assertion. DeFrancis, supra note 13, at 18.
1974]
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to determine cases of physical abuse28 and that they need special
encouragement to report because of professional problems with re-
porting not faced by others. 21 In addition, those favoring limited
Statistics confirm that physicians are usually the first source of help for abused children.
In a special sample of a nationwide survey, it was found that hospitals, clinics or private
medical doctors were the first source contacted for help subsequent to an abusive incident in
51.3 percent of the cases. GIL, supra note 1, at 123.
28. McCoid, supra note 13, at 27-28; Paulsen, supra note 13, at 3-4.
An important aid for the physician in cases of suspected child abuse is the radiologic
examination. The findings allow a diagnosis of trauma even where the clinical history is
otherwise. See, e.g., Kempe, et al., supra note 3, at 23. However, a warning was given that
patient and systematic study still needs to be done to determine actual abuse. See Elmer,
Hazards in Determining Child Abuse, 45 CHILD WELFARE 28 (1966).
One physician has developed a physician's index of suspicion:
History
1. Parents often relate story that is at variance with clinical findings
2. Multiple visits to various hospitals
3. Familial discord of financial stress, alcoholism, psychosis, perversion,
drug addiction, etc.
4. Reluctance of parents to give information
5. Admittance to hospital during evening hours
6. Child brought to hospital for complaint other than one associated with
abuse and/or neglect, e.g., cold, headache, stomach ache, etc.
7. Date of injury prior to admission
8. Parent's inappropriate reaction to severity of injury
9. Inconsistent social histories
Physical Examination
1. Signs of general neglect, poor skin hygiene, malnutrition, withdrawal,
irritability, repressed personality
2. Bruises, abrasions, burns, soft-tissue swellings, hematomas, old healed
lesions
3. Evidence of dislocation and/or fractures of the extremities
4. Coma, convulsions, death
5. Symptoms of drug withdrawal
Differential Diagnosis
1. Scurvy and rickets
2. Infantile cortical hyperostosis







5. Previously healed periosteal calcifications
6. "Squaring" of the metaphysis
Fontana, The Diagnosis of the Maltreatment Syndrome in Children, 51 PEDIATRICS 780, 781
(1973).
29. It is argued that the medical profession has a particularly strong tradition of profes-
sional confidentiality. See McCoid, supra note 13, at 28-29; Paulsen, supra note 13, at 4, 7.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 4
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required reporting contend that diffusing the duty to report to all
persons makes the duty no one's duty?0
In contrast, proponents of universal reporting argue that it is a
moral duty of all persons to aid abused children.3 ' Legislatively
mandating this moral duty maximizes casefinding, enabling protec-
tive services to be extended to more children.3 2 Finally, proponents
of a universal duty contend that most reporting is done by non-
physicians, and the reporting law, with its immunity grant for re-
porting, would encourage even more reporting from these sources.13
In its change in those required to report, Indiana may have
achieved by indirection the benefits pointed to by both sides. Physi-
cians in the state were made aware of a special duty on them to
report by the 1965 law. The 1971 law, while extending the potential
for casefinding to all persons, may not have mitigated the impor-
tance of this special duty in the mind of the individual physician.
The result makes universal reporting particularly valuable in Indi-
ana.
Whatever the statutory language, physicians appear to avoid
30. Paulsen, supra note 13, at 6. Paulsen's solution is to require only physicians to
report, but to grant to all other reporters in good faith immunity from civil and criminal
liability resulting from the report. Id.
Diffusing the reporting duty may also have positive effects, however. When the duty to
report is only on physicians, abusive parents or caretakers may be reluctant to seek medical
help for their child because of fear of being reported by the physician. A wider class of required
reporters may lessen this fear. Reinhart & Elmer, The Abused Child, 188 J.A.M.A. 358, 360
(1964).
31. DeFrancis, supra note 13, at 20.
32. Id. Paulsen counters this argument as follows:
Although such a moral duty may be admitted, a reporting statute's proper function
is neither to enlarge the potential for casefinding, nor to articulate a moral duty, but
to spur reporting and, hence, actual casefinding. Arguably, physicians encounter the
great bulk of the most serious child abuse cases, yet fail to report many of them. If
physicians can be persuaded to report the cases which come to their attention, a most
important gain will have been made.
Paulsen, supra note 13, at 5-6.
.33. DeFrancis, supra note 13, at 20. Non-medical sources account for nearly one-half
of all child abuse reports. Of the sample group of Gil's nationwide survey, 49.2 percent of the
reports came from other than medical personnel. GIL, supra note 1, at 123. Statistics from
Massachusetts confirm the great amount of reporting done by the general public. In one year
before the state's reporting law was enacted, relatives of the child were responsible for 24
percent of all reports and neighbors for 22 percent. Bryant, Billingsley, Kerry, Leefman,
Merrill, Senecal, & Walsh, Physical Abuse of Children - An Agency Study, 42 CHILD
WELFARE 125, 127 (1963).
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reporting incidents of child abuse. In a special sample of a 1967
nationwide survey, it was found that private medical doctors were
the initial source contacted for help with abused children in 5.1
percent of the cases, but they filed only 2.8 percent of all reports of
abuse. 4 Indiana physicians are probably no exception.
Although reporting is an unavoidable duty of all persons, any
failure of physicians to report cases of child abuse is particularly
inexcusable.35 They have both special competence to detect abuse
and a professional responsibility to help the abused child and his
family. Helping abused children cannot be limited merely to treat-
ing existing injuries, but must be concerned with the child's future
safety. If physicians ignore this responsibility for the child's contin-
ued welfare at home, 25 to 50 percent of the victims of child abuse
will be permanently injured or killed within several months of their
return home.3 6 Besides this moral obligation, the reporting law
places upon the physician a clear legal obligation to report cases of
child abuse.3 1
Grounds Requiring a Report
Reports are required under the Indiana law where a person "has
reason to believe" the child has been abused.3 8 This is an objective
standard dependent on what the reasonable man would do rather
than what the individual involved actually thinks. Such an objec-
34. GIL, supra note 1, at 124. Even more startling are findings from New York City in
1969. Of the 2,600 cases of child abuse brought to the attention of authorities during the year,
only 11 were reported by private physicians. Solomon, supra note 1, at 775.
35. The common excuses given for the failure of physicians to report instances of child
abuse include: (1) difficulty in believing that parents could have attacked their children (See,
e.g., Kempe, et. al., supra note 3, at 19); (2) lack of knowledge on the subject (See, e.g.,
Silver, supra note 3, at 814); (3) belief that abuse must be proved to be reportable (See,
e.g., Reinhart & Elmer, supra note 30, at 359); (4) respect for the ethic of privileged com-
munication (See, e.g., Reinhart & Elmer, supra note 30, at 359); and (5) past experience or
frustrations encountered when dealing with community or legal agencies (See, e.g., Silver,
supra note 3, at 814).
36. Heifer, The Responsibility and Role of the Physician, in THE BArERED CHILD 43,
51 (R. Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1968). This essay is an excellent guide to the physician's
function in cases of child abuse.
37. In Indiana, a failure to report child abuse is a misdemeanor. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-
1427(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(b) (1973). Civil liability may also be
incurred for failure to report. Children who suffer abuse after a physician has failed to report
an earlier incident may have a cause of action against the physician. Paulsen, supra note 13,
at 34-36.
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 4
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tive standard encourages the reporting of all borderline cases by
physicians and others since an individual opinion of non-abuse
would not be a defense for failure to report if most others would have
filed a report. Increased reporting of borderline cases may uncover
incidents where there is a concerted effort to conceal the abuse. The
objective standard offers, then, greater protection for the child. It
is also easier to apply than a subjective standard.
Age
Age of the victim is no longer important in determining whether
a report of abuse is required in Indiana. The protection of the stat-
ute extends to all incidents involving a "child."3 Under the 1965
law, reporting was required only for incidents involving children
under 16 years old.4 0 Presumably, the designation "child" extends
at least to 18 year olds, the upper limit for juvenile court jurisdic-
tion." Since approximately 6 percent of child abuse victims are age
15 and over,4" some of these children would not have been protected
by the 1965 law.
Identity of the Perpetrator
Unfortunately, a provision of Indiana's reporting law limits re-
quired reporting to incidents involving abuse "by a parent or other
person responsible for his care." 3 This places upon the reporter
what is essentially an investigative task - determining the relation-
ship of the perpetrator of the abuse to the child. Investigation is
more properly a function of public agencies. In addition, the statu-
tory wording fails in its effort to protect children since it emphasizes
the abuser's identity rather than the child's enviroment. If a child
39. Id.
40. Ch. 268, § 2 [1965] Ind. Acts 737.
41. County departments of public welfare are directed to interpret "child" to mean
persons under 18 years of age. DIvISIoN OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, INDIANA STATE DEP'T OF
PUBLIC WELFARE, BULLETIN No. 43 at 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
BULLETIN).
42. See GIL, supra note 1, at 105. Earlier studies had found that child abuse was mainly
limited to the very young. Bryant, et al., supra note 33, at 128 (one-half less than seven years
old); Cameron, Johnson & Camps, The Battered Child Syndrome, 6 MED., Sci., & LAw 2, 5
(1966) (79 percent less than two years old); Elmer, supra note 28, at 30 (one-half under nine
months of age). Gil explained that these earlier findings were principally from hospital studies
with a bias toward more severely injured abused children, who are likely to be young. GIL,
supra note 1, at 105.
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
19741
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is in a potentially abusive situation, the precise perpetrator of that
abuse matters little.44 The statutory language is based on the as-
sumption that most abusive incidents are attributable to the par-
ents themselves and that the parents will protect their child from
abuse by those outside of the family. While this assumption is gen-
erally correct,45 those few cases where the parent either refuses or is
unable to do anything when his child is abused by an outsider justify
a change in the statutory language to require a report regardless of
the perpetrator's relationship to the child.
Nature of the Injuries
Another judgment required for reporting under the Indiana law
is that the injury be inflicted on the child "other than by accidental
means."46 Since the usual explanation offered for a child's injuries
is one of accident or accidents,47 the important factor becomes
whether the reporter believes such an explanation is valid. Only
physicians are competent to evaluate the validity of any explana-
tion for the child's injuries in most cases. The wording "other than
by accidental means" is a result of a law initially directed only at
physicians. As such, it should have been eliminated when the duty
to report was made universal in 1971.
There is also a question as to the viability of Indiana's statutory
language since some accidental injuries ought to be reported. Gross
parental or caretaker negligence is often as dangerous to the child
as is intentional injury and surely may require state intervention for
the child's protection." An objection to requiring reports when par-
ental negligence is involved is simply that parents are not capable
44. "Child abuse in most situations is a family affair. It is not helpful to waste time by
trying to determine which parent beats the child. You know that if one parent does the act,
the other, in some way, permits it to happen." Heifer, The Etiology of Child Abuse, 51
PEDIATRIcs 777, 777-78 (1973).
45. In 86.8 percent of the sample group of Gil's nationwide survey, the perpetrator was
a parent or parent substitute with whom the child had been living. GIL, supra note 1, at 116.
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
47. Indeed, the discrepancy between clinical findings and parental explanations is a
major diagnostic feature of child abuse. Kempe, et al., supra note 3, at 18. A table contrasting
the probable truth with the original explanation given by the parent in 29 cases can be found
in Cameron, Johnson, & Camps, supra note 42, at 6.
48. Severe or gross child neglect, included in which would be failure to protect a child
from injuring himself, is probably more widespread than child abuse. Solomon, supra note
1, at 774.
[Vol. 9
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of watching over their children at all times. Nevertheless, gross
parental indifference should be cause for reporting if protection of
the child is the foremost goal. Parents reported unnecessarily can
subsequently show that they acted reasonably.
The Indiana statute calls for the reporting of "physical" in-
jury. 9 This implies any physical injury. Thus, there is no require-
ment that the injuries be serious, as in some states." Such wording
provides an important protection for the child since minor injuries
may be the first clue to an environment with the potential for seri-
ous abuse. Early discovery is crucial for providing help for the par-
ents or caretakers as well.
What Indiana and all other states have seemingly overlooked
is reporting for cases which result in death.5 ' It is obviously too late
to help the victim when child abuse results in death. However, in
addition to any statistical importance, the reporting of deaths due
to child abuse may protect other children in the same family. In a
sample group of a 1967 nationwide study, abuse to siblings of the
currently abused child occurred in 27 percent of the cases.5"
Recipient of the Report
In Indiana, reports of abusive incidents may be made "to the
county department of public welfare or the proper law enforcement
agency.'53 Allowing the reporter a choice may encourage reporting
by those who would be reluctant to report to either of the alterna-
tives. In practice, the Indiana Department of Public Welfare has
apparently preempted the role of the police or sheriff's department
in receiving reports from hospitals and physicians. Reporting forms
of the welfare department are automatically supplied to hospitals
and are given to physicians upon request.54 Reports from the general
49. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
Besides physical abuse, emotional and social abuse are simply too vague for the law at
present. For this reason, the reporting laws are limited to physical abuse or neglect. Silver,
supra note 3, at 805. Mental cruelty is included, though, in Indiana's definition of criminal
cruelty to children. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-813 (Repl. 1956), IND.CODE § 35-14-1-2 (1971).
50. Twenty-four states require reporting only when the injuries are "serious" or "se-
vere." A list of these states can be found in Daly, supra note 13, at 318 n.182.
51. Paulsen, supra note 13, at 12. Paulsen adds that deaths resulting from child abuse
may have to be reported by implication in Arkansas where coroners must report. Id.
52. GIL, supra note 1, at 114.
53. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
54. Interview with Phoebe Leeds, Director of Child Welfare Services, Porter County
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public often come to the police,5 however, perhaps because law
enforcement agencies are the usual recipients of reports of a crime.
In addition, the police often discover instances of child abuse them-
selves while investigating family quarrels.56
Commentators seem to agree that reporting to the department
of public welfare is the most desirable,57 although law enforcement
agencies are valuable recipients of reports because they are avail-
able on a 24-hour basis. 8 As a result, the choice in Indiana's law
seems to provide a solution. 59 It has been suggested, however, that
allowing a choice of report recipients has the disadvantages of con-
fusion, difficulty in keeping accurate statistics and the possibility
of uneven treatment of cases."0 At least in smaller communities in
the state these disadvantages have not been troublesome. The po-
lice and the sheriff's department refer the cases reported to them to
the department of public welfare with the result that both groups
are involved at once." This practice of referral to the welfare depart-
ment is valuable in eliminating the disadvantages of allowing a
choice of recipients and so should be a requirement of the reporting
law. 2 In addition, mandatory referral to the welfare department
Department of Public Welfare, in Valparaiso, Indiana, Feb. 4, 1974 [hereinafter cited as
Leeds Interview].
At Porter Memorial Hospital in Valparaiso, Indiana, the hospital's Director of Social
Service completes the forms supplied and forwards them to the county department of public
welfare. Hospital policy is not to notify any law enforcement agency, but to report solely to
the welfare department. Interview with Arthur Malasto, Administrator, Porter Memorial
Hospital, in Valparaiso, Indiana, Feb. 1, 1974.
55. Interview with Lee Miller, Chief of Police, Valparaiso, Indiana, in Valparaiso, Indi-
ana, Feb. 5, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Miller Interview].
56. Id.
57. The reasoning is that reports should go directly to the agency that provides protec-
tive services for children. See Daly, supra note 13, at 325-26; DeFrancis, supra note 13, at
22-23; McCoid, supra note 13, at 51-56; Paulsen, supra note 13, at 44-45.
58. Paulsen, supra note 13, at 44.
59. Alabama, Connecticut, Utah, and Wisconsin provide the same choice between wel-
fare department and law enforcement agency as does Indiana. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp.
1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp.
1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (Supp. 1973).
60. Daly, supra note 13, at 323. This position is based on the assumption of lack of
cooperation of the various agencies involved in child abuse, an assumption which may not
always be true.
61. Leeds Interview, supra note 54.
62. Illinois has such a requirement. Reports may be made to law enforcement agencies,
but, if this is done, the welfare department must be informed. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2043
(1968).
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ensures that the services of the department will not be overlooked.
Contents of the Report
A report of child abuse in Indiana needs to include only "such
information, as may be available to the person making such report,
including his own identification."" The law contains no require-
ment that the reporting person make a report in writing. Under the
1965 reporting law, the county department of public welfare was
required to provide forms on which reports were to be made. 4 These
forms, no longer required by the current law, are still in use. 5 They
include two sections. The first is to be completed, as nearly as
possible, by all persons, while the second section is directed to medi-
cal personnel only. 6 If the reporter does not elect to write his own
report, the county department of public welfare is responsible for
reducing the report to writing on the proper form.6"
The reporting law's requirement that the reporter identify him-
self creates unnecessary problems. No action can be taken when
anonymous telephone calls are made to the department of welfare
or the police, 8 and some reporters continue to insist on remaining
anonymous even when informed of their duty under the reporting
law. 9 This requirement of identification, evidently designed to en-
sure reliability of the reporter, may prevent the protection of a child
63. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
64. Ch. 268, § 3, [1965] Ind. Acts 738.
65. The forms were revised to conform to the 1971 reporting law. CHILD WELFARE SERV-
ICES BULLETIN, supra note 41, at 3.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3-4.
68. The Indiana State Department of Public Welfare does not recommend a literal
reading of the reporting law, however. A bulletin interpreting Indiana's reporting law for the
staff provides:
As in any protective service case, the failure of a reporting person to identify himself
does not justify the ignoring of his report by the county department. If enough
substantive information can be obtained by the county department to indicate that
the anonymous claim of child abuse may be bona fide, an investigation is to be made.
CHILD WELFARE SERVICES BULLETIN, supra note 41, at 4.
69. Leeds Interview, supra note 54. When a county department of public welfare en-
counters an anonymous reporter, the procedure is as follows:
There may be some reports of abuse in which the reporting person will not give his
identity. Whether the person conforms to the law in this matter is his own decision.
If the anonymous report is given in person or by telephone the department should
interpret the requirement in the law that provides for identification of who is making
the report and an effort made to help the person feel secure in giving his identity.
CHILD WELFARE SERvicEs BULLETIN, supra note 41, at 4.
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from abuse. 0 An informer as to criminal activity need not always
identify himself before the police may investigate.7' Telephone hot-
lines for reporting drug pushers and crime allow callers to remain
unidentified. Since child abuse may involve criminal penalties," the
same rule should apply to investigation of the child's situation. The
identification requirement also may discourage legitimate reporting
by neighbors and others who do not want to take an accusatory role.
A much more effective manner of dealing with malicious reports of
child abuse than requiring the reporter to identify himself is the
exercise of good discretion by the welfare department and police in
investigating complaints. Before initiating investigation, either
agency should be convinced that the unidentified reporter had at
least some first-hand knowledge of the abuse.
Besides identifying themselves, licensed medical personnel
must supply additional information when making a report. This
includes "the nature and extent of the child's injuries including any
evidence of previous injuries."74 Such information may be valuable
in a proceeding to remove the child from his home or in a criminal
prosecution of the perpetrator. Also valuable, but only required
when the medical reporter believes it might be helpful, is informa-
tion "establishing the cause of the injuries and the identity of the
perpetrator.""
Action Upon Receipt of a Report
Upon receipt of a report, the law enforcement agency or welfare
70. Indiana Gov. Otis R. Bowen recently complained that the identification require-
ment "makes it difficult to act on child abuse instances." Gary Post-Tribune, Feb. 27, 1974,
at A-5, col. 3.
71. The requirements of competency and credibility of a police informant, as set out in
Aguilar v. Texas, 373 U.S. 108 (1964), apply to applications for search or arrest warrants, not
investigations themselves. For investigation of an incident of child abuse, a search warrant
would not ordinarily be necessary. In addition, there is a trend toward permitting the issuance
of a search warrant without regard to particularized considerations of reliability when the
informant is an ordinary citizen, as opposed to a regular police informant. See Thompson &
Starkman, The Citizens Informant Doctrine, 64 J. CRiM. LAW & CRIMIN. 163 (1973). Since all
reports of child abuse come from ordinary citizens, relaxed standards of reliability would be
applicable to the reporters.
72. Criminal penalties for child abuse are discussed notes 122-85 infra and accompany-
ing text.
73. Indiana State Department of Public Welfare procedures already take this position.
See note 68 supra.
74. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1973).
75. Id.
[Vol. 9
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department "shall immediately cause an investigation into the facts
contained therein." 6 This statutory language permits each agency
to do its own investigation. This may not be the best provision for
investigation of child abuse incidents. By profession, and often by
nature, social workers of the welfare department are not adept at
the necessary investigation for possible criminal prosecution. In the
same manner, police agencies are not adept at identifying social and
psychological problems, assessing family functioning and estimat-
ing the adequacy of child care. Since both sets of agency skills are
necessary in cases of child abuse, combined investigation seems to
be the answer. In many communities of the state, combined investi-
gation may be what is happening in practice."
After the investigation is completed, the Indiana reporting law
gives little direction as to what is to be done next. Its only instruc-
tions are unfortunately directed at criminal prosecution of the per-
petrator. "If the facts so warrant," a written report of the investiga-
tion is to be made to the county prosecutor. 8 While such a report
should certainly be made, provision for protection of the child
should also be required. Accordingly, language which invokes the
protective services of the state would be appropriate. Practically
speaking, the welfare department will certainly provide such serv-
ices where necessary without statutory language to that effect. How-
ever, stressing criminal prosecution to the exclusion of protective
services for the child may give the statute a retributive tone that
discourages reporting. 9 It is also inconsistent with the purposes of
the reporting law "to provide protection for children."
A glaring omission from the statutory directions for action to
be taken upon receipt of the report is the failure to suggest that
protection may be needed for other children in the family as well
76. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1428(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-3(a) (1973).
77. This is especially so in smaller communities. In Valparaiso, a caseworker and the
police often make the first visit to a reported family together. Miller Interview, supra note
55.
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1428(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-3(a) (1973).
79. Few persons favor criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of abuse. In a nationwide
opinion survey, only 27.1 percent of the survey population believed that perpetrators of child
abuse should be jailed or punished in some other way. GIL, supra note 1, at 66. As a result, if
there is stress upon criminal prosecution resulting from a report, reporting may be discour-
aged from those favoring treatment and supervision rather than punishment.
80. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1426 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-1 (1973).
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as for the abused child.8' When the child that is the target of abuse
is removed from the home, there is great danger of attack upon the
child's siblings.82 Abusive parents or caretakers frequently shift the
focus of their abuse to the remaining children in the family. 3 This
suggests that protection of all children in the family of the child
reported to be abused may be necessary. The reporting law should
clearly stress this concern in its directions for action to be taken by
the welfare department or law enforcement agency when receiving
a report of abuse.
Immunity Granted to Reporters
Those who report incidents of child abuse under Indiana's re-
porting law are granted immunity from any civil or criminal liability
resulting from the report or subsequent judicial proceedings.84 This
immunity extends only to reports made in good faith.85 Although the
immunity provision applies to all reporters,8 it is primarily designed
to encourage reporting by physicians who would otherwise be fearful
of legal liability for reporting.87 Commentators have pointed out
that statutory immunity for reporting is probably unnecessary. 8 An
Indiana appellate court decision suggests that this is true. In Rhiver
v. Rietman, 8 the court recognized the immunity of a physician from
civil liability for submitting a report on the plaintiff's mental condi-
tion in a proceeding to commit the plaintiff to a mental institution.
Since no statutory immunity is granted for civil commitment pro-
ceedings, the court found immunity as a matter of public policy:
As a matter of public policy immunity must attach to wit-
nesses aiding commitment proceedings. If it were otherwise
the cooperation of physicians, who by statute are called
upon to offer expert judgment upon the sanity of another,
81. Reinhart & Elmer, supra note 30, at 360.
82. In Gil's nationwide survey, 27 percent of the sample families included siblings who
had been victims of abuse prior to the reported incident. GIn, supra note 1, at 114.
83. Shifting abuse can be assumed since child abuse is considered a pattern of child-
rearing. See generally note 1 supra.
84. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1429 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-4 (1973).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Daly, supra note 13, at 328; DeFrancis, supra note 13, at 32; McCoid, supra note
13, at 39; Paulsen, supra note 13, at 31.
88. McCoid, supra note 13, at 37-39; Paulsen, supra note 13, at 31-34.
89. 148 Ind. App. 266, 265 N.E.2d 245 (1970).
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would be lost. Fear of vexatious litigation would thwart the
power of the state to provide for protection of the com-
munity against the pyschopathic mentally ill, and for the
protection of the mentally ill individual against himself. 0
The same policy reasons exist for granting immunity in cases of
child abuse. Nevertheless, the reporting law's statutory immunity
is valuable in making certain that immunity exists for the reporter.
Abrogation of Evidentiary Privileges
By statute, Indiana establishes the physician-patient and
husband-wife privileges.' The reporting law abrogates both of these
privileges in proceedings pursuant to the report and in prosecutions
for cruelty to children and allied offenses." To obtain information
as to the child's injuries, abrogation of the physician-patient privi-
lege is not technically necessary since the child, not the perpetrator
of the abuse, is the patient. An early decision of the Indiana Su-
preme Court, Hauk v. State,9" established that the physician-
patient privilege is to protect only the patient. In a prosecution for
an unlawful abortion, the court found that testimony against the
defendant by an examining physician as to the fact that an abortion
had been induced was admissible. The court stated:
The rule declared by the statute, which forbids a physician
to reveal in evidence matters discovered by him in the
course of professional attendance or treatment of a patient,
is intended to protect the latter, and not to shield one who
is charged with perpetrating an unlawful act upon the pa-
tient. 4
The rationale of the privilege may, though, still be applicable
to cases of child abuse. In North American Union v. Oleske,95 a
physician was precluded from testifying as to a statement made to
him by a patient's wife concerning the patient's condition. Since the
patient was unconscious, he was unable to give the physician any
account of the cause, origin or history of his ailment." The court
90. Id. at 271, 265 N.E.2d at 248.
91. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Repl. 1968), IND. CODE § 34-1-14-5 (1973).
92. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1430 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-5 (1973).
93. 148 Ind. 238, 46 N.E. 127, 47 N.E. 465 (1897), overruled on other grounds in White
v. State, 234 Ind. 209, 125 N.E.2d 705 (1955).
94. 148 Ind. at 260-61, 46 N.E. at 134.
95. 64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N.E. 68 (1917).
96. Id. at 442, 116 N.E. at 70.
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held that where the intervention of a third person is necessary for
the patient to communicate with the physician in order to receive
effective treatment, the physician-patient privilege is applicable to
the information so communicated." Communication through par-
ents may be the only manner in which a physician can get the
information necessary to treat an abused child, especially if the
child is young. The physician-patient privilege, under the reasoning
of Oleske, could be applicable to such situations. However, the abor-
gation of the privilege by the reporting law removes any doubt as
to the existence of a privileged communication.
The aborgation of the physician-patient privilege in the report-
ing law may be more sweeping than simply the elimination of the
privilege so as not to exclude evidence of the child's injuries. The
1965 reporting law specifically limited the aborgation to "evidence
regarding a child's injuries, or the cause thereof.""8 On its face, the
current law abrogates the physician-patient privilege without limi-
tation as to subject matter in any judicial proceeding under the
child abuse reporting chapter or in criminal prosecutions for cruelty
or neglect of children.99 Conceivably, the physican-patient privilege
could not be invoked to exclude the testimony of a psychiatrist who
treated the perpetrator of the abuse.' ° It is unclear whether the
legislature intended to extend the scope of the abrogation to this
extent by its revision. However, two factors support a wide interpre-
tation of the reporting law's abrogation of the physician-patient
privilege. First, the privilege is in disfavor both generally'"' and in
Indiana.'0 2 Second, since the child's welfare under the custody of the
97. Id.
98. Ch. 268, § 7, [1965] Ind. Acts 738.
99. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1430 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-5 (1973).
100. Normally, the physician-patient privilege would be applicable to a psychiatrist,
as a licensed physician, under IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Repl. 1968), IND. CODE § 34-1-14-5
(1973). A psychologist has been found to be not normally included in the physician-patient
privilege in Indiana. Elliott v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1969) (applying
Indiana law). However, the legislature has established a limited psychologist-client privilege,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3617 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 25-33-1-17 (1971). On the
psychologist-client privilege in Indiana see Olson, A Look at Indiana Code 31-1-14-5: Indi-
ana's Physician-Patient Privilege, 8 VAL. U.L. REV. 37, 42-43 (1974).
101. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 105 (Cleary ed. 1972); 8 J. WIG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2380 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
102. See generally Collins v. Bair, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971); Alder v. State,
239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958); Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1949); Myers
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perpetrator of the abuse is at issue in proceedings to remove the
child from his home, it is valuable to have unimpeded access to
evidence of the psychological condition of the perpetrator. The need
for this evidence outweighs any chilling effect abrogation of the
physician-patient privilege would have on the perpetrator's free dis-
cussion in counseling sessions with a psychiatrist.
Abusive incidents often involve one parent acquiescing in the
other's mistreatment of the child. °3 In addition, over 90 percent of
the incidents occur in the child's home.'0 4 For these reasons, the
reporting law's abrogation of the husband-wife privilege is impor-
tant.' 5 To disqualify the testimony of one parent as to the other's
misconduct would be inadvisable when he or she is usually the only
witness to the actual abuse.
Child's Competence to Testify
Indiana's reporting law provides that a child may testify in a
judicial proceeding concerning an abusive incident when the child,
regardless of age, is deemed competent by the court.'10 This provi-
sion was evidently thought to be necessary to overcome the statu-
tory rule'07 that children under 10 years of age are not competent
witnesses unless they understand the nature and obligation of an
oath.'0 8 In reality, the two provisions seem to say the same thing.
Whatever the effect of the reporting law's assertion of competence,
the necessity of its application will be rare. Children subject to
abuse are usually either too young to tell the story or too fearful of
parental retribution for doing so.'10
A Central Registry
No central registry of reported child abuse cases in the state is
v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922); Gen. Accident Fire and Life Assurance Co. v.
Tibbs, 102 Ind. App. 262, 2 N.E.2d 229 (1936). See also Olson, supra note 100; Note,
Testimonial Privilege and Competency in Indiana, 27 IND. L.J. 256 (1952).
103. Heifer, supra note 44, at 777-78.
104. GIL, supra note 1, at 118.
105. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1430 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-5 (1973).
106. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1431 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-6 (1973).
107. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Repl. 1968), IND. CODE § 34-1-14-5 (1973).
108. McCormick contends that if the words "understand the nature and obligation of
an oath" are applied literally, the most intelligent witness could hardly meet the standard,
much less a child. The rule confuses a religious standard with a mental standard. C.
McCoRMICK, supra note 101, at § 62.
109. Kempe, et al., supra note 3, at 18.
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required under the Indiana statute. However, as part of administra-
tive procedure, each county department of public welfare forwards
monthly reports of abusive incidents to the state department."'0
These reports are solely for statistical purposes.
It has been suggested the central registries be established for
the additional purpose of facilitating identification of abused chil-
dren.I". Since abusive parents or caretakers frequently skip from one
hospital or physician to another in an effort to avoid detection,"2 a
central registry serves as a clearinghouse for multiple reports of
abuse involving the same child or family. Physicians or others un-
sure of abuse in regard to a particular child may check with the
registry under the child's name for additional evidence to confirm
their suspicions. But, central registries involve important questions
of privacy and fairness. ' 3 Access to their information must be lim-
ited so as to prevent widespread invasion of family privacy. In addi-
tion, there is a question whether a reporter should make the decision
to report on the basis of anything other than the child's present
condition. If a report was made in regard to a particular child in the
past, this may cause an unsure reporter to conclude unjustifiably
that abuse is now present."4 Yet, for conducting an adequate inves-
tigation, the department of public welfare or law enforcement
agency must have information on prior incidents of abuse."5 Each
county department of public welfare has information in its files on
any prior incidents within the county. As part of administrative
procedure, the state department should maintain a central registry
110. Leeds Interview, supra note 54.
111. Paulsen, supra note 13, at 24-25.
112. Fontana, Donovan, & Wong, supra note 3, at 1391; Reinhart & Elmer, supra note
30, at 360. After a few months of operation, no evidence of this commonly assumed phenome-
non was found in Illinois' central registry, however. Ireland, A Registry on Child Abuse,
CHILDREN, May-June 1966, at 113, 115.
113. Paulsen gave the following warning:
The existence of a central registry used for anything but statistical purposes raises
sensitive issues of privacy. Some means should be found to remove from the registry
the cases in which abuse was found not to have occurred. An entry in the registry
can bring an unjustified loss of reputation. Authorized persons are, after all, human
beings who react adversely to parents listed in the registry; further, no firm assur-
ances can be given that the registry will only be available to authorized persons.
Paulsen, supra note 13, at 30-31.
114. Id. at 31.
115. A description of the workings and value of Illinois' central registry, access to which
is limited to welfare department personnel, can be found in Ireland, supra note 112.
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of cases to enable the county departments to check on prior abusive
incidents for children and families not already in their files.
Penalty for Failure to Report
It is a misdemeanor for anyone to consciously fail to report an
instance of child abuse in Indiana."' The penalty is a fine of not
more than $100 or imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or
both."7 Although a prosecution for failure to report is highly un-
likely, especially since the failure must be a conscious one,"8 the
provision for penalties serves as a spur to reporting by all persons.
It also has two subsidiary practical effects. First, the existence of
criminal penalties provides the reporter with an excuse when he is
criticized for reporting or begged not to report."9 Second, reporters
who attempt to remain anonymous, thus preventing investigation,
can be reminded that it is a misdemeanor not to report.'20
Even with its weaknesses, Indiana's reporting law is important
in triggering the state's responses to child abuse. These responses
take two general forms: criminal prosecution of the perpetrator and
civil protection of the child. The criminal response will be discussed
next.
THE CRIMINAL LAW
Commentators are nearly unanimous in agreeing that criminal
prosecution of the perpetrator is not the answer to preventing child
abuse.' The threat of criminal penalties provides little deterrent to
the motivations of most adults who cruelly ill-treat children.2 2 Yet,
116. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1427(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(b) (1973).
117. Id.
118. The language is as follows: "Any person who consciously fails to make the report
required .... Id.
119. Daly, supra note 13, at 336; Paulsen, supra note 13, at 9.
120. This is the procedure used by county departments of public welfare. See note 69
supra.
121. Daly, supra note 13, at 297-99; DeFrancis, supra note 13, at 5-6; Paulsen, The
Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 692-93 (1966); Note, The
Battered Child - Louisiana's Response to the Cry, supra note 13, at 382-83; Note, The
Battered Child: Logic in Search of Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 364, 382-83 (1971). Contra,
Collins, The Role of the Law Enforcement Agency, in THE BA"rERED CHiLD 201, 201-02 (R.
Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1968).
122. Perpetrators of child abuse have psychological difficulties that are not susceptible
to the workings of the criminal law:
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in serious cases, criminal prosecution of the perpetrator may be
justified. Perpetrators of child abuse in Indiana can be prosecuted
either under general criminal law provisions for homicide'23 and as-
sault and battery" 4 or under a set of statutes dealing specifically
with crimes against children. 21
Homicide
When abuse leads to the death of the child, Indiana's homicide
statutes' become applicable. In two reported cases involving
abused children, convictions for second degree murder have been
affirmed. The killing must be done "purposely and maliciously" to
qualify as murder in the second degree. 7 In Mobley v. State,'21 the
earlier of the two cases, a catalog of horrors both as to injuries and
methods of their infliction is presented. Although it is little dis-
cussed in the opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court seemed to imply
malice from the extent of the injuries themselves as well as from the
evidence as to the manner in which the injuries were received.2 9 The
concurring judge was more explicit on the question of malice. He
On the other hand, conviction followed by punishment does nothing to really change
the parent's character structure and behavior; rather, it is one more reinforcing
repetition of the experience of being disregarded, attacked, and commanded to do
better - the very things which led him to be an abuser in the first place. As one of
our patients put it, "As soon as I get out of the penitentiary, we're going to get out
of this state to where we aren't known. Then we'll have some kids and raise them
the way want to."
Steele & Pollock, supra note 1, at 145.
123. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3401 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (Cum. Supp.
1973) (first degree murder); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3404 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-1-
54-1 (1971) (second degree murder); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3405 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE
§ 35-13-4-2 (1971) (manslaughter).
124. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-403 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-1-54-4 (1971) (assault
and battery); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-410 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-13-3-1 (1971)
(aggravated assault and battery); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-401(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE
§ 35-13-2-1 (1971) (assault or assault and battery with intent to kill).
125. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-812 to -16 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE §§ 35-14-1-1 to -7
(Cum. Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-807 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-3-1 (Cum.
Supp. 1973).
126. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3401 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (Cum. Supp.
1973) (first degree murder); IND. ANN. STAT § 10-3404 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-1-
54-1 (1971) (second degree murder); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3405 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE
§ 35-13-4-2 (1971) (manslaughter).
127. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3404 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-1-54-1 (1971).
128. 227 Ind. 335, 85 N.E.2d 489 (1949).
129. Id. at 343, 85 N.E.2d at 492.
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explained that in beating the three-year-old child the mother and
her boyfriend are presumed to have "intended the natural and prob-
able consequences of their acts."'' ° Since the child had been beaten
severely on several previous occasions,' 3 ' the presumption was easily
drawn.
The issue of the requisite malice produced two dissenting
judges in Corbin v. State. 32 There, apparently with his fists, a father
beat his one-month-old daughter to death.' 33 As in Mobley, the ma-
jority depended on the nature of the attack to imply malice:
Anyone with reasonable judgment would know that one of
the blows of the magnitude of any of these numerous blows
could have fatally injured this child, which apparently was
sick at the time. Where such blows of such magnitude are
repeated, any jury would have the right to conclude that
the perpetrator intended to kill. Malice as a legal inference
may be deducted from a perpetration of any cruel act, and
the law presumes an individual intends the consequences
of his acts.' 3
A fact aiding in this inference in cases involving child abuse is the
disparity in size between the perpetrator and the child. The court
explained that intent "may be inferred particularly in view of the
relative size, age and strength of the defendant and the victim."'3
The dissenters disagreed with the majority as to the presence
of malice because the defendant had made several statements about
losing his temper with the child. Such statements, the dissenters
argued, clearly showed lack of purpose to kill.' 3 To the majority, the
defendant's statements about losing his temper were just one part
of the evidence. In addition, the majority responded that it is com-
mon knowledge that a person may lose his temper and still intend
to kill.'31
130. Id. at 345, 85 N.E.2d at 493 (Emmert, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 341-43, 85 N.E.2d at 491-92.
132. 250 Ind. 147, 234 N.E.2d 261 (1968).
133. Id. at 150, 234 N.E.2d at 262.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 151, 234 N.E.2d at 262.
136. Id. at 160, 234 N.E.2d at 267 (Mote, J., dissenting; Jackson, J., concurring in
dissent).
137. Id. at 152, 234 N.E.2d at 263.
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A particularly instructive revelation made in Corbin was that
the defendant had been previously convicted of cruelty to his daugh-
ter and another child.' 38 This was apparently only one instance in a
"long history of child abuse" by the defendant.' 31 In fact, the fatal
incident involved in the case occurred just a few weeks after the
defendant's release from a six months' term at the Indiana Farm.'10
Two obvious conclusions can be drawn from fhese facts. First, the
protective machinery of the state was grossly inadequate. Second,
criminal penalties for child abuse were not effective. Dissenting
Judge Mote was so disturbed as to plead that "[a] new statute to
govern childbeaters and family abusers is needed for the protection
of family life and society in general."' 4 '
Less than a year before Corbin, the Indiana Supreme Court
reduced a conviction for second degree murder to involuntary man-
slaughter in Hutchinson v. State.'42 The critical difference seemed
to be the lack of evidence as to the actual manner of the infliction
of the injuries. The defendant admitted punishing the child with a
belt, but there was little explanation for the child's lacerated liver.'
As a result, the majority suggested that a conviction for second
degree murder "would necessitate an inference upon a speculation,
which the law does not permit.' 44 In dissent, Judge Hunter found
five factors from which an inference of malice would be permissible.
He pointed out that a liver is normally ruptured by forceful impact;
that there was no other explanation for the ruptured liver; that there
was evidence of previous acts of violence to the child by the defen-
dant; that neighbors heard the child's screams; and that there was
evidence of the defendant's jealousy toward the child.1 45
Due to the secretive nature of child abuse,'46 the incomplete
138. Id. at 151, 234 N.E.2d at 263.
139. Id. at 158, 234 N.E.2d at 267 (Mote, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 157, 234 N.E.2d at 266.
141. Id. at 159, 234 N.E.2d at 267.
142. 248 Ind. 226, 225 N.E.2d 828 (1967).
143. Id. at 231, 225 N.E.2d at 831.
144. Id. at 232, 225 N.E.2d at 832.
145. Id. at 243, 225 N.E.2d at 838 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
146. A pathologist and deputy coroner of Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio, has ex-
plained that investigation of homicides involving children differs in several major ways from
the exploration of the unlawful killing of adults. First, the victim's youth and inability to
communicate put investigating officials under a severe handicap. Second, nearly all of the
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 4
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evidence in Hutchinson as to the manner of the infliction of injuries
would seem to be typical. Hutchinson indicates that convictions for
second degree murder will be difficult to obtain without more evi-
dence than that the child was injured by means unexplained other
than by intentional infliction of injury. This is so even where there
is evidence of previous abusive incidents. There must be definite
evidence of infliction of injury by the defendant, as in Mobley and
Corbin, before malice may be implied by the jury.
Where the death of a child results from parental neglect rather
than active abuse, prosecution for involuntary manslaughter is pos-
sible.'4 In Eaglen v. State,'45 parents were convicted of involuntary
manslaughter when their four-month-old child died from pneu-
monia induced by malnutrition. The court rejected the father's con-
tention that the criminal neglect of his wife was an excuse for his
failure to provide for the child. "If anything," the court insisted,
"one parent's duty to look after his children increases when the
other is guilty of neglect."'' This reasoning may be equally applica-
ble to cases where one parent is present and acquiesces in the other's
abuse of a child. In such cases, any parent or caretaker could con-
ceivably be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter when the
abuse results in death whether or not that parent or caretaker was
the actual perpetrator of the abuse.
Assault and Battery
Another criminal law category not dealing specifically with
crimes against children is assault and battery. Perpetrators of child
abuse in Indiana may be conceivably prosecuted for assault and
battery,'50 aggravated assault and battery'5' and assault and battery
with intent to kill.'52 It was decided in an early Indiana case's that
assaults resulting in homicides occur in the home, where there is often little indication of
violent abuse. Finally, upon questioning, the child's parents or caretakers offer a variety of
explanations for the death. Adelson, Slaughter of the Innocents, 264 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1345,
1348-49 (1961).
147. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3405 (CuM. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-13-4-2 (1971).
148. 249 Ind. 144, 231 N.E.2d 147 (1967).
149. Id. at 150, 231 N.E.2d at 151.
150. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-403 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-1-54-4 (1971).
151. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-410 (Cum. Supp. 1973) IND. CODE § 35-13-3-1 (1971).
152. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-401(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-13-2-1 (1971).
153. Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N.E. 777 (1891).
1974]
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the existence of criminal provisions relating specifically to cruelty
to children does not preclude prosecution for assault and battery.
The county prosecutor has, then, a choice of two different routes of
prosecution.
The right of parents to punish their children was raised as a
defense against prosecution for assault and battery in Hinkle v.
State.'54 There a father had kept his 12-year-old daughter chained
by the ankle to a sewing machine as punishment.'55 The Indiana
Supreme Court acknowledged such a parental right to punish chil-
dren, but insisted that it extended only to "proper and reasonable
chastisement," not "brute force and abuse."'56 The court went on
to say what is reasonable is a question for the jury. '57 With this case,
Indiana joined those states that follow the "objective" rule which
holds parents to the standard of what is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.' As long as punishment does not exceed that which
the ordinary parents would administer if faced with the same situa-
tion, it is allowed under this rule.' 9
Punishment exceeding the standard becomes assault and bat-
tery. A later Indiana case,'60 in which a father used a buggy whip to
punish his son, contains a concise statement of the rule:
The law is well settled that a parent has the right to admin-
ister proper and reasonable chastisement to this child with-
out being guilty of an assault and battery; but he has no
right to administer unreasonable or cruel and inhuman
punishment. If the punishment is excessive, unreasonable,
or cruel it is unlawful.' 6'
Since all incidents of genuine child abuse are excessive, unreasona-
ble or cruel by definition, they clearly violate the rule. Therefore,
154. Id.
155. Id. at 491-92, 26 N.E. at 777.
156. Id. at 492-93, 26 N.E. at 778.
157. Id. at 492, 26 N.E. at 778.
158. The older rule holds parents liable if the punishment is inflicted with malice or
results in permanent injury to the child. A North Carolina case presents the leading exposi-
tion of this rule. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837).
159. Paulsen, supra note 121, at 687.
160. Hornbeck v. State, 16 Ind. App. 484, 45 N.E. 620 (1896).
161. Id. at 485, 45 N.E. at 620.
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the right to discipline children is no defense in any criminal prosecu-
tion for abusing a child.
Cruelty to Children
Perpetrators of child abuse can also be prosecuted under Indi-
ana's statutes dealing specifically with cruelty to children and child
neglect.'62 These cruelty and neglect statutes overlap considerably
the general assault and battery provisions since the typical case of
child abuse could certainly be characterized as an assault and bat-
tery. However, the more particularized statutes also capture acts of
cruelty difficult to define as assault and battery. Helwig v. State6
is an example. There a father was convicted of cruelty to his three
children when he left them in the car for several hours on a winter
day while he was in a tavern.6 4
A definitional section' sets out four specific offenses against
children: abuse, 66 abandonment,' 7 cruelty' and neglect. 6 , The
162. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-812 to -16 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE §§ 35-14-1-1 to -7
(Cum. Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-807 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1
(Cum. Supp. 1973).
163. 238 Ind. 559, 153 N.E.2d 437 (1958).
164. Id. at 562, 153 N.E.2d at 438.
165. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-813 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-2 (1971).
166. Abuse is defined as follows:
Abuse of a child shall consist in any of the following acts: (a) disposing of the custody
of a child contrary to law; (b) employing or permitting a child to be employed in any
vocation or employment injurious to its health or dangerous to its life or limb, or
contrary to the laws of this state; (c) employing or permitting a child to be employed
in any occupation, employment or vocation dangerous to the morals of such child;
(d) the habitual use by the parent or by a person having the custody and control of
a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or obscene language; (e)
the performing of any indecent, immoral or unlawful act or deed, in the presence of
a child, that may tend to debauch or endanger or degrade the morals of the child, or
(f) permitting or allowing any other person to perform any indecent, immoral or
unlawful act in the presence of the child that may tend to debauch or endanger the
morals of such child.
Id.
167. Abandonment is defined as follows:
Abandonment of a child shall consist in any of the following acts by any one having
the custody or control of the child: (a) wilfully forsaking a child; (b) failing to care
for and keep the control and custody of a child so that the child shall be exposed to
physical or moral risk without proper and sufficient protection; (c) failing to care for
and keep the control and custody of a child so that the child shall be liable to be
supported and maintained at the expense of the public, or by child caring societies
or private persons not legally chargeable with its or their care, custody and control.
Id.
168. Cruelty is defined as follows:
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normal case of child abuse would be included not under the statu-
tory definition of abuse, but under the cruelty definition. Included
in this broad definition of cruelty are both the infliction of physical
and mental injury and both acts of commission and omission. Cus-
tody or control of the child is necessary for the offenses of abandon-
ment and neglect, while abuse and cruelty may be committed by
any person.
Since two separate sections'70 impose different penalties for
these offenses against children, they result in a confusing overlap
and the potential for uneven treatment of perpetrators. An 1889
statute makes it a misdemeanor for any person to "cruelly ill-treat,
abuse, overwork or inflict unnecessary cruel punishment" upon any-
one under age eighteen or for any person having care, custody or
control to "wilfully abandon or neglect" a child under age eight-
een.' This penalty section corresponds well with the definitional
section.'72 The offenses of abuse and cruelty are included in the
clause of the penalty provision applicable to "any person," while
punishment for abandonment or neglect is limited to those having
care, custody and control of the child by the second clause. The
Cruelty to a child shall consist in any of the following acts: (a) inflicting unnecessarily
severe corporal punishment upon a child; (b) inflicting upon a child unnecessary
suffering or pain, either mental or physical; (c) habitually tormenting, vexing or
afflicting a child; (d) any wilful act of omission or commission whereby unnecessary
pain or suffering, whether mental or physical, is caused or permitted to be inflicted
on a child; (e) or exposing a child to unnecessary hardships, fatigue or mental or
physical strains that may tend to injure the health or physical or moral well-being
of such child.
Id.
169. Neglect is defined as follows:
Neglect of a child shall consist in any of the following acts by anyone having the
custody or control of the child: (a)- wilfully failing to provide proper and sufficient
food, clothing, maintenance, regular school education as required by law, medical
attendance or surgical treatment, and a clean and proper home, or (b) failure to do
or permit to be done any act necessary for the child's physical or moral well-being:
Provided, however, that no provision of this act shall be construed to mean that a
child is neglected or lacks proper parental care whose parent, guardian or custodian
in good faith selects and depends upon spiritual means or prayer for the treatment
or cure of disease or remedial care of such child.
Id.
170. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-807 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-3-1 (Cum. Supp.
1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-815 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
171. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-807 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-3-1 (Cum. Supp.
1973).
172. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-813 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-2 (1971).
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definitional section contains this same division since the offenses of
abandonment and neglect are based on a duty owed to the child.
A second statutory section7 3 provides different penalties for
abuse, abandonment, cruelty and neglect. Originally misdemean-
ors, "'74 the offenses became felonies under this section in 1963.' A
perpetrator of child abuse can be prosecuted, then, under this 1945
penalty section or under the 1889 misdemeanor statute. A readily
apparent result of this choice is the potential for uneven treatment
of cases. A parent who physically abuses his child may be convicted
of a felony in one county, while a second parent may be convicted
of only a misdemeanor in another county. To prevent this variation,
the 1889 misdemeanor statute should be repealed."' If criminal
prosecution is appropriate in a particular case, the level of the pen-
alty should be that of a felony. Prosecution for a misdemeanor may
result in a penalty as small as a $5 fine. 7 '
Wording changes enacted in 197117 may render the entire 1945
felony provision only applicable to those having the care, custody
and control of the involved child, however. As it now reads, the
penalty applies to "[a]ny parent, guardian or person having the
care, custody or control of any child who shall abuse, abandon, be
cruel to or neglectful of such child, or any person who shall be
deemed to be guilty of 'cruelty and neglect of children.' "," The
offenses of abuse, abandonment, cruelty and neglect are included
for persons having care, custody or control of the child, but not for
"any person." Instead, the penalty has general applicability only if
the person is guilty of "cruelty and neglect of children."'79 It can be
argued that to be guilty of cruelty and neglect, a person must stand
173. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-815 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-4 (Cum. Supp.
1973).
174. Ch. 218, § 4, [1945] Ind. Acts 1011.
175. Ch. 114, § 1, [1963] Ind. Acts 98.
175.1 The proposed final draft of Indiana's Penal Code consolidates the two existing
penalty sections into one which makes willful cruelty to a child a class D felony. INDIANA
CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMMISSION, INDIANA PENAL CODE § 35-16.1-1-3 (Proposed Final Draft
1974).
176. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-807 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-3-1 (Cum. Supp.
1973).
177. Pub. L. No. 456, § 1, [19711 Ind. Acts 2093.
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in a relation of care, custody or control to the child since the word
"neglect" implies a duty. If this interpretation of the statute is
correct, a person other than one having the care, custody or control
of the child could be prosecuted only under the 1889 statute with a
misdemeanor penalty or under general assault and battery provi-
sions.'o
Two factors suggest that such a restrictive reading of the pen-
alty provision may be incorrect. First, under that interpretation, the
language of the second clause in the penalty section would be mere
surplusage. Since the first clause refers to those having care, custody
or control of the child, it would be a meaningless duplication if the
second clause were interpreted to mean the same thing. Second, the
language of the provision prior to 1971 gives an explanation of the
meaning of "guilty of 'cruelty and neglect of children.' " Before
1971, the clause read in part: "or any person who shall abuse, be
cruel to or neglectful of any child shall be deemed to be guilty of
'cruelty and neglect of children.' "s' This explanation in the earlier
and more expansive penalty provision suggests that care, custody or
control is not necessary for any person to be guilty of "cruelty and
neglect of children." By implication, Ault v. State's2 supports this
conclusion. In Ault, the Indiana Supreme Court found that charging
the defendant, who did not have care, custody or control of the child
involved, under both the contributing to delinquency statute'8 and
the felony statute for cruelty and neglect would be invalid because
of duplicity. This indicates, then, that prosecution of the defendant
could have been made separately under the felony provision for
cruelty and neglect despite the lack of care, custody or control.
The joining of cruelty and neglect with the copulative conjunc-
tion "and" instead of with the disjunctive conjunction "or" fosters
needless confusion. Until this is remedied by the legislature, the
courts should interpret "guilty of 'cruelty and neglect of children'"
180. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-403 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-1-54-4 (1971) (assault
and battery); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-410 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE 35-13-3-1 (1971) (aggra-
vated assault and battery); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-401(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-
13-2-1 (1971) (assault or assault and battery with intent to kill).
181. Ch. 218, § 4, [1945] Ind. Acts 1011.
182. 249 Ind. 545, 233 N.E.2d 480 (1968).
183. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-812 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-1 (1971).
[Vol. 9
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to mean guilty of either abuse or cruelty of children.8 .' Such a
reading of the penalty section would coordinate it with the defini-
tional statute for the offenses against children. By definition, any
person may be guilty of abuse or cruelty to children, while care,
custody or control of the child is necessary to be guilty of the offen-
ses of abandonment and neglect.'84 Since the first clause of the pen-
alty section applies to those persons having care, custody or control
of the child that are guilty of abuse, abandonment, cruelty or neg-
lect, the second clause should apply to any person guilty of abuse
or cruelty.
Two important sections were added to the provisions on crimes
against children in 1971.185 These deal with the custody of the child
involved both while the criminal prosecution is pending and after
its conclusion. When an arrest for abuse, abandonment, cruelty or
neglect is made, either the prosecuting attorney or county depart-
ment of public welfare may file a petition or motion with the court
having criminal jurisdiction to have the child removed from its par-
ents or caretakers. Any removal is effective only pending determina-
tion of the accused person's guilt. If the accused is acquitted, or the
charges dismissed, the court must return the child unless the wel-
fare department petitions the juvenile court to retain custody on
civil grounds. If the accused is convicted, the juvenile court is to
determine the child's disposition.
The value of these custody provisions for cases of abuse, aban-
donment, cruelty and neglect is readily apparent. However, they
overlook the equally important need of protecting other children
under the control or custody of the accused person. These other
children may already need protection, or they may become targets
of parental or caretaker abuse once the particular child involved is
183.1 Such a reading of the statute should be necessary only for a short time. The
unified penalty section for cruelty to children in the proposed final draft of Indiana's Penal
Code is applicable only to those who have the care, custody or control of the child. Comments
to the section indicate that the intention is to cover acts of cruelty to a child by those without
the care, custody or control of the child in the proposed sections on crimes against the person.
INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMMISSION, INDIANA PENAL CODE § 35-16.1-1-3 (Proposed Final
Draft 1974).
184. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-813 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-2 (1971).
185. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-816 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-5 (Cum. Supp.
1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-816(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-1-6 (Cum. Supp.
1973).
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removed from the home.' Although normal civil wardship proceed-
ings can be initiated for the protection of these children,"s7 their
disposition would be more conveniently handled with the disposi-
tion of the actual victim.
THE JUVENILE COURT
Whether the perpetrator of the abuse is punished under the
criminal law or not, the state has an obligation to protect the child
from further abuse. This protective function is exercised through the
juvenile court. The purpose clause of Indiana's juvenile care chapter
recites that children under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court "are
entitled to the protection of the state, which may intervene to safe-
guard them from neglect or injury."'8 8
The Power to Act
Protection of a child from abuse may extend even as far as
removal of the child from his parents or caretakers. In Van Walters
v. Board of Children's Guardians of Marion County, 18 9 the Indiana
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of removing a child
from its home where the parents are unfit:
It is therefore proper to assume that our constitution, and
our laws enacted under it, sanction and confirm the great
principle of the sovereign's guardianship of the children
within the dominions of the sovereign. But while it is true
that this great principle is thus sanctioned and confirmed,
it is still true that the equally great principle that natural
right vests in parents the custody and control of their chil-
dren is confirmed and enforced. This high and strong natu-
ral right yields only when the welfare of society or of the
children themselves comes into conflict with it; but where
there is such conflict the supreme right of guardianship
asserts itself for the protection of society and the promotion
of the welfare of the wards of the commonwealth .... 110
186. As to this danger see notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
187. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-8 (1973).
188. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3201 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-1 (1973).
189. 132 Ind. 567, 32 N.E. 568 (1892).
190. Id. at 569, 32 N.E. at 569.
[Vol. 9
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A later case'9' reaffirmed this principle for the present statute92
authorizing the state's supervision of children improperly cared for
by their parents or caretakers.
More specifically, the juvenile court has authority to act in
regard to abused children under its jurisdiction over neglected chil-
dren.' 3 Two separate statutory sections in Indiana's juvenile law
define neglected child in essentially the same way.'94 The 1945 defi-
nition includes a child who "[b]y reason of neglect, cruelty or
disrepute on the part of parents, guardians or other persons in whose
care the child may be is living in an improper place" or "is in an
environment dangerous to life, limb or injurious to the health or
morals of himself or others."'9 5 An abused child would fall under
either of these two clauses of the 1945 definition as well as the nearly
identical clauses of the 1907 definition.'
Invoking the Power of the Juvenile Court
Independent of Indiana's child abuse reporting law, cases of
child abuse may be brought to the attention of the juvenile court.
"Any person may and any peace officer shall" report dependent,
191. Egoff v. Bd. of Children's Guardians of Marion County, 170 Ind. 238, 84 N.E. 151
(1908).
192. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-504 (Repl. 1964), IND. CODE § 12-3-3-1 (1973).
193. Three different statutes authorize the juvenile court to hear cases concerning de-
pendent or neglected children. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2808 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-
5-5-3 (Cum. Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-8
(1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-505 (Repl. 1964), IND. CODE § 12-3-3-2 (1973). The first two
statutes are part of Indiana's juvenile law article (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3201 to -3224 (Cum.
Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5 (1973)), while the third is in the newly created child welfare
article (IND. CODE § 12-3 (1973)).
194. The following two definitional sections correspond with two of the statutes author-
izing the juvenile court to hear cases concerning dependent and neglected children: IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-2807 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-5-2 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3206 (Repl.
1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-6 (1973). The authorization statute in the child welfare article has
no corresponding definitional statute.
195. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3206 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-6 (1973).
196. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2807 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-5-2 (1973). These clauses
are:
[O]r whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of its parent
or parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for
such child; or whose enviroment is such as to warrant the state, in the interest of
the child, in assuming it guardianship.
It is interesting to note that the 1907 definition applies only to boys under 16 years old and
girls under 17 years old, while the 1945 definition extends to all children under 18 years old.
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neglected or delinquent children to the court.'97 Since abused chil-
dren fall within the definition of neglect, this allows reporting of
cases of child abuse to the juvenile court in addition to the reports
required by the reporting law. The reporting law serves, then, to
make the reporting of a specialized group of neglect cases manda-
tory. These are cases involving purposeful infliction of injury upon
children. In response to the growing recognition of the active batter-
ing of children, Indiana, as all other states, singled out such children
for special protection in the form of mandatory reporting.
A formal petition to have the child declared dependent and
neglected can only be filed by the probation officer of the court or
the department of welfare.' Limiting the filing of wardship peti-
tions to the probation officer of the court and the department of
welfare is designed to prevent insubstantial petitions. In 1957, the
Indiana Court of Appeals,'99 anxious to protect parents and caretak-
ers from unnecessary proceedings with a penal tone, construed the
intent of the legislature to be that no one other than the juvenile
court's probation officer could file a petition. The legislature re-
sponded two years later with an amendment authorizing filing by
the county department of public welfare.2 0 This extension was both
logically and practically necessary since the welfare department is
given supervision of all dependent and neglected children by stat-
ute2"' and is generally best qualified to evaluate the necessity for
filing a wardship petition.
If cases of child abuse are reported to the juvenile court under
the broad designation of neglect, the court is to conduct, as far as
possible, " a preliminary investigation of the home and environmen-
tal situation of the child, his previous history and the circumstances
of the condition alleged."202 This provision for investigation by the
juvenile court makes it possible for an alleged incident of child
abuse to be investigated by three separate agencies: the county
197. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-8 (1973).
198. Id.
199. Shupe v. Bell, 127 Ind. App. 292, 141 N.E.2d 351 (1957).
200. Ch. 76, § 1 [1959] Ind. Acts 155 (codified at IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Cum.
Supp. 1973, IND. CODE § 31-5-7-8 (1973)).
201. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-504 (Repl. 1964), IND. CODE 12-3-3-3 (1973).
202. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-8 (1973).
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department of public welfare,"0 3 a law enforcement agency04 or the
juvenile court. Spreading investigatory powers so widely is unneces-
sary. In addition, it is inappropriate for the machinery of the juve-
nile court to investigate the same cases that it may have to decide
later. The solution is to strip the juvenile court of its preliminary
investigatory powers in regard to dependent and neglected children.
Indiana's mandatory reporting law could then be expanded to re-
quire reporting of cases of neglected children in its more broad
meaning. The classification "dependent children" should be elimi-
nated since its definition is included in the current definition of
neglect. 05 With these changes, all cases of neglected children, in-
cluding both acts of commission and omission, could be investigated
pursuant to the reporting law. Consolidated reporting and investiga-
tion will both provide more even treatment of cases and concentrate
state resources for maximum effectiveness.
Hearings
In child abuse cases it is often imperative that the child be
immediately removed from his home. Emergency removal before a
hearing is possible in Indiana in two ways. First, an officer of a law
enforcement agency can take a child into custody if the child's
"surroundings are such as to endanger his health, morals or welfare,
unless immediate action is taken." 06 This action must be reported
to the juvenile court.0 7 Second, the juvenile court may issue an
emergency wardship order.0 ' In either case, a formal hearing is held
within several days.0 ' Parents or caretakers are given the necessary
notice of the hearing"' and are advised as to where they can seek
both legal"' and rehabilitative help.2 12 By this time, the services of
203. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1428(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-3(a) (1973).
204. Id.
205. Note, Dependency and Neglect: Indiana's Definitional Confusion, 45 IND. L.J. 606,
611 (1970).
206. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3212 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-12 (1973).
207. Id.
208. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3209 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-9 (1973).
209. Interview with Alfred Pivarnik, Indiana Circuit Court Judge with juvenile court
duties, in Valparaiso, Indiana, Feb. 6, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Pivarnik Interview].
210. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3209 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-9 (1973).
211. Counsel is not provided in Indiana, although there is a trend in that direction in
several states. Note, Parents' Right to Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings, 49
IND. L.J. 167, 180 (1973).
212. Pivarnik Interview, supra note 209.
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the county department of welfare have also been made available to
the parents or caretakers.113
The hearings on a wardship petition are conducted in the infor-
mal manner of juvenile court."' This informality is important in
avoiding an accusatory tone that may make the parents or caretak-
ers refuse rehabilitative help. In fact, two authorities on child abuse
suggest that more satisfactory dispositions are made when the hear-
ings are held in the judge's chambers with attorneys, parents, wel-
fare personnel and physicians simply discussing all aspects of the
case." 5
Evidence
Indiana has no special evidentiary rules in child protection
hearings. Two such New York rules have particular value in protect-
ing children from abuse and should be adopted in Indiana. The
first" ' is designed to provide protection for other children in the
home of an abused child:
[P]roof of the abuse or neglect of one child shall be admis-
sible evidence on the issue of the abuse or neglect of any
other child of, or the legal responsibility of, the respon-
dent. ,7
The potential for protection provided by this rule is obvious. At
least half of the child abuse victims in a sample of a nationwide
survey in 1967 had been prior victims of abuse. 18 Between 30 and
40 percent of the parents had been perpetrators of abuse in the
past.2"9 Siblings of the currently abused child had been victims of
abuse prior to the present incident in 27 percent of the sample
families. 20 As was concluded from these findings, "physical abuse
213. The services of the county department of public welfare are to be extended during
initial investigation following a report of abuse. CHILD WELFARE SERvicEs BULLETIN, supra note
41, at 6.
214. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-15 (1973).
215. Heifer & Kempe, Editors' Note to THE BATTERED CHILD at 200 (R. Heifer & C.
Kempe eds. 1968).
216. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
217. Id.
218. GIL, supra note 1, at 108.
219. Id. at 114.
220. Id.
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of children is more often than not an indication of a prevailing
pattern of caretaker-child interaction in a given home rather than
of an an isolated incident.""2 ' Protecting children from such a pat-
tern of abuse is the aim of the New York rule.
New York's family courts have vigorously applied this eviden-
tiary rule. In fact, in their eagerness to protect other children in the
home of the abused child, the family courts may have gone beyond
the New York legislature's intent. The rule states that evidence of
proof of previous abuse to one child shall be admissible to determine
the abuse or neglect of another child of the parents or caretakers.2
There is no statutory language indicating that the previous evidence
of abuse is alone sufficient to establish the neglect of another child.
Yet, this is how the rule has been read:
Although there is not one scintilla of evidence to show
abuse or neglect of the child Richard, to remove the child
from the home is not a violation of due process or a violation
of their constitutional rights.2 3
In another case a neglect petition filed just five days after a child's
birth successfully relied on the evidentiary rule to obtain a re-
moval.2 4 This rule has even been applied to remove a child before
it arrived home from the hospital after birth.2 25
Although the New York legislature may not have intended the
judicial interpretation given the rule, 26 the result seems eminently
fair. It allows the state to protect not only those children who have
been abused, but also those that are likely to suffer serious harm
221. Id. at 108.
222. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
223. In re Edwards, 70 Misc. 2d 858, 861, 335 N.Y.S.2d 575, 580 (1972).
224. In re Baby Boy Santos, 71 Misc. 2d 789, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1972).
225. In re J, 71 Misc. 2d 815, 335 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1972). However, a petition to obtain
custody at birth of a later child in the same family was denied when the court found that
the parents had stabilized themselves. In re J, 72 Misc. 2d 683, 687, 340 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310
(1972).
226. Two commentators have suggested that the rule would provide that evidence of
abuse of one child shall constitute prima facie proof of neglect of another child in the same
family if it was intended to be interpreted as the courts have interpreted it. They contend
that the effect of the interpretation is to allow insubstantial petitions to be filed "in hope
that subsequent investigation will produce sufficient evidence to justify the judicial interven-
tion into the family that has already occurred." Ellison & Occhialino, Family Law, 1971
Survey of New York Law, 23 SYRAcusE L. Ray. 675, 700-701 (1972).
1974]
et al.: Indiana's Statutory Protection for the Abused Child
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
126 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
from improper guardianship. Family court Judge Dembitz has sup-
plied the most telling argument in favor of the evidentiary rule as
applied:
Cases like the instant one of maltreatment of a prior child
present one of the few situations in which this Court, and
social agencies at its instance, can be alerted to take before-
the-fact protective measures.227
Other judges in the family court have talked of invoking state inter-
vention when there is "clear and present danger" of abuse to a
child.228 Such preventive action by the courts is necessary if the state
is to be truly effective in executing its duty to protect children from
abuse.
Louisiana,2 9 Montana 30 and South Dakota 3' have judicially
developed rules that evidence of prior abuse by particular parents
or caretakers may be sufficient for a determination of neglect as to
another child in the same home. Justification for the rule has been
found in the environment clauses of the dependency and neglect
definitions of the Montana and South Dakota statutes. 232 The South
Dakota Supreme Court insisted it could not "allow the health,
safety or life of a young child to be placed back into an environment
conclusively proved, as evidenced by the treatment of her brother,
to be wholly unfit and improper. 2 33 There is no necessity for evi-
dence as to the abuse of the other children to be removed from an
abused child's family since the emphasis is on the potential for
abuse rather than actual abuse. With no evidence of the mistreat-
ment of the sister of a severely abused boy, the Montana Supreme
Court stated:
The question to be resolved in this case was whether or not
the adoptive parents were fit and proper parents and since
227. In re G, 74 Misc. 2d 606, 610, 344 N.Y.S.2d 422, 426 (1973).
228. In re Edwards, 70 Misc. 2d 858, 862, 335 N.Y.S.2d 575, 581 (1972); In re S, 66 Misc.
2d 683, 698,-322 N.Y.S.2d 170, 185 (1971).
229. In re State ex rel. Thaxton, 220 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1969).
230. In re Phelps, 145 Mt. 557, 402 P.2d 593 (1965).
231. In re K.D.E., __ S.D. __, 210 N.W.2d 907 (1973).
232. In re Phelps, 145 Mt. 557, 559, 402 P.2d 593, 595 (1965); In re K.D.E., - S.D.
- -_ 210 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1973).
233. In re K.D.E., - S.D. -, -, 210 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1973).
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we concur with the trial judge that they are not, we concur
in his actions with respect to the little girl.234
Such a rule could be formulated in Indiana. The Indiana definition
of neglected child includes both a dangerous environment clause
and language concerning "living in an improper place" due to neg-
lect, cruelty or disrepute on the part of parents or caretakers.2 35
These clauses seemingly allow removal of a child from an eviron-
ment shown to be abusive on the basis of previous incidents involv-
ing other children in the family.
A second important New York evidentiary rule creates a pre-
sumption of abuse or neglect from the circumstances of the abusive
incident.131 It provides:
Proof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of
a child of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained
or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the
parent or other person responsible for the care of such child
shall be prima facie evidence of child abuse or neglect, as
the case may be, of the parent or other person legally re-
sponsible. 217
This presumption is similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
the area of negligent torts.2 38 Before this presumption was enacted
by the New York legislature in 1970, 23 a family court judge had
recognized the value of the concept of res ipsa loquitur in cases of
child abuse. He "borrowed" the concept so as to let the condition
of an abused child speak for itself.24 0
Such an evidentiary rule is necessary for cases of child abuse
since the child is usually either too young or too fearful to tell what
happened, and the parents seek to protect each other. 4' Outside
234. In re Phelps, 145 Mt. 557, 559, 402 P.2d 593, 595 (1965).
235. Both the 1907 and 1945 definitions contain such language. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-
2808 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-5-3 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3206 (Repl. 1956),
IND. CODE § 31-5-7-6 (1973).
236. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 1046(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
237. Id.
238. For a description of res ipsa loquitur see W. PROSSER, TORTS § 39 (4th ed. 1971).
239. Ch. 962, § 9, [1970] Laws of N.Y. 2033.
240. In re S, 46 Misc. 2d 161, 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (1965).
241. Adelson, supra note 146, at 1348-49.
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witnesses of an abusive incident are rare. 42 If the child is to be
properly protected, it seems justifiable to draw an inference of abuse
or neglect from the child's age and condition. Applying the concept
of res ipsa loquitur, a child with bruises and broken bones is not in
the physical condition which in the ordinary course of things would
exist if the parent who is responsible for the child is not abusive. A
child returned wrongly to an abusive environment has a 25-50 per-
cent chance of re-injury.243 This fact necessitates adoption of the
presumption in Indiana.
The effect of the New York statutory presumption is to shift the
burden of explaining the child's injuries to the parents or care-
takers once evidence of the child's condition has been established
by medical and other testimony. In reality, this may be what hap-
pens in Indiana's wardship hearings even without the presumption.
After learning of the extent of the child's injuries, the juvenile
judge may turn to the parents and ask simply, "What happened?"
The presumption does make a difference when the parents or care-
takers fail to give any or an adequate explanation, however. With
the New York statutory presumption the condition of the child is
prima facie evidence of abuse or neglect, and absent an adequate
explanation, abuse or neglect is established.' On the other hand,
the inference provided by borrowing res ipsa loquitur or an informal
call for explanation once the condition of the child is established,
do not theoretically allow the child to be declared abused or neg-
lected even if no explanation is given.245 The value of the statutory
presumption thus becomes apparent.
Since this presumption of abuse or neglect is made in civil
proceedings, there is little problem with its constitutionality on due
process grounds. All that is necessary is that, judging the conveni-
ences, 246 it is fair to place on the child's parents or caretakers the
242. Id. at 1348.
243. Heifer, supra note 36, at 51.
244. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1016 (1964).
245. PROSSER, supra note 238, at 228.
246. The test of comparative convenience was suggested in Morrison v. California, 291
U.S. 82 (1933). There in referring to presumptions in criminal cases, the Supreme Court said:
The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make
it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or
explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities
[Vol. 9
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burden of providing an explanation as to the child's injuries.247 Since
the parents or caretakers have care and control of the child, it is
certainly more fair to have them explain the injuries than for the
welfare department to attempt such an explanation. Neither is New
York's statutory presumption invalid as a violation of the parents'
or caretakers' privilege against self-incrimination. Citing Yee Hem
v. United States, 245 a family court judge upheld the constitutionality
of the presumption on the ground that there is no mandatory re-
quirement that the parents or caretakers provide an explanation or
even testify.249 The constraint is merely by force of circumstances if
they wish to retain custody of the child. 50
Disposition
If the hearing results in a determination of neglect, the juvenile
court may place the abused child under supervision in his own home
or make him a ward of the court, the department of welfare or a
child care agency.251 Wardship may last indefinitely in Indiana; its
duration is usually related to the progress made by the parents or
caretakers in counseling with the county department of public wel-
fare or other service agency. 252 If rehabilitative efforts succeed, the
wardship may be dissolved, and the child returned to his home.2 53
On the other hand, if the parents are completely unreceptive to help
or make no progress in rehabilitation, the juvenile court may be
petitioned to hold a hearing on termination of parental rights. 5
This permanent termination of the rights of the parents or caretak-
ers in the child is considered a severe remedy. 25
for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser
without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.
Id. at 88-89.
247. For a discussion of the constitutionality of statutory presumptions in civil cases
see Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527,
538-41 (1955).
248. 268 U.S. 178 (1925). In Yee Hem, the Supreme Court upheld a statutory presump-
tion that all smoking opium found in the possession of an individual had been imported
contrary to law. The presumption was not found to violate the privilege against self-
incrimination.
249. In re S, 66 Misc. 2d 683, 690, 322 N.Y.S.2d 170, 177 (1971).
250. Id.
251. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-15 (1973).
252. Pivarnik Interview, supra note 209.
253. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3216 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-7-17 (1973).
254. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-3-1-7 (1973).
255. Pivarnik Interview, supra note 209.
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Wardship is not easily dissolved. The burden is on the parents
or caretakers to show that they have significantly changed and are
now able to provide a safe environment for the previously abused
child. In a recent case 5' involving a child found to be dependent,
the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
Once the child is found to be a "dependent child," and the
parental relationship is severed, the change of the state of
mind, habits, and circumstances of the parent essential to
provide a fit home for the child is a matter solely up to the
parent. The burden of going forward with the evidence
should be, and is, upon the parent to show such a change
of conditions and reformation that the best interests of the
child would be served by returning the child to the par-
ent.
257
Placing such a heavy burden on parents or caretakers seeking to
have a previously abused child returned to them is appropriate for
two reasons. It both ensures adequate protection for the child and
encourages the parents or caretakers to seek rehabilitative help if
they want to have the child returned to them.
Criminal Sanctions
Whenever any child is found to be dependent or neglected, the
parents or caretakers of that child or any other person responsible
for or contributing to that child's condition may be convicted of a
misdemeanor in juvenile court. 28 However, there is an important
proviso. The juvenile court has the power to suspend judgment and
put the defendent on probation for two years. 259 Conditions of the
probation are that the defendant personally appear in juvenile court
when ordered to do so and follow the court's instructions as to the
care of the dependent or neglected child.
This 1907 statutory section should be repealed. It overlaps un-
necessarily with the criminal law provisions for cruelty and neglect
256. In re Collar, Ind. __, 294 N.E.2d 179 (1973).
257. Id. at __, 294 N.E.2d at 182.
258. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2809 (Repl. 1956), IND. CODE § 31-5-5-4 (1973).
259. Id.
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of children.26 In addition, punishing the parents or caretakers of an
abused or neglected child is not a proper function for the juvenile
court. Juvenile courts are to provide protection for children in an
atmosphere that is not made overly accusative in nature by the
threat of criminal sanctions against the child's parents or caretak-
ers. Further, the supervision provided by placing the parents or
caretakers on probation can be achieved by the juvenile court in its
normal disposition of the child.
PROTECTIVE SERVICES
In addition to the protection offered by its reporting law, crimi-
nal law and juvenile courts, Indiana provides protective services for
abused children through each county department of public wel-
fare. 6' These services are designed to first evaluate and then help
to manage the family problems of abusive parents or caretakers.
Other than a general statement of a duty,6 2 the laV offers little
direction in the provision of protective services for children that are
abused or neglected. It is odd, for example, that Indiana's child
abuse reporting law requires the county department of public wel-
fare to "investigate" the incident, 263 but not to offer its social serv-
ices to the parents and caretakers of the child.
In practice, social services are made available when incidents
of child abuse are reported to the department of welfare. 264 For those
families already receiving assistance from the department for other
reasons, help is offered through their regular caseworker. 25 The de-
partment's section on child welfare also becomes involved with the
child itself, but not the parents or caretakers. If the family is not
260. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-812 to -16 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE §§ 35-14-1-1 to -7
(Cum. Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-807 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-14-3-1 (Cum.
Supp. 1973).
261. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-504 (Repl. 1964), IND. CODE § 12-3-3-1 (1973).
262. Id.
263. IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1428(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-3(a) (1973).
264. Directions from the state department to all county departments of public welfare
include:
In addition to investigation, the child and family involved in each such case will be
provided the benefits of the child welfare program including casework services, home-
maker services, medical assistance and foster care as indicated by the needs and
circumstances of the case.
CHILD WELFARE SERVICES BULLETIN, supra note 41, at 9.
265. Leeds Interview, supra note 54.
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receiving other assistance from the department, the child welfare
section works with both parents or caretakers and the child. 6'
Since protective services are offered without court order, they
raise serious questions of privacy and due process. It is easy for an
offer of services to an abusive parent or caretaker to become coer-
cive, especially if the family is already receiving other assistance
from the department. In addition, Indiana law fails to provide basic
guidelines to safeguard the legal rights of families faced with inter-
vention by the welfare department. The power of the county depart-
ment of public welfare to intervene is not precisely delineated by
statute. No provision is made for a hearing to decide the continued
necessity for protective services once they have been voluntarily
accepted by the family." 7 Neither must notice be given of right to
counsel. 6 8 Due process may require such fundamental safeguards
since state intervention in providing protective services approaches
the category of a constitutionally protected search.269
CONCLUSION
Indiana has the basic statutory framework necessary for pro-
tecting the abused child. However, this framework needs thoughtful
additions, revisions and consolidations. Implementation should
begin with the enactment of a broad child protection article as part
of Indiana's family law. At the beginning of the article should stand
the mandatory reporting law, 70 newly enlarged to require reporting
of cases of child neglect as well as abuse. The provisions on depen-
266. Id.
267. One commentator has suggested that a hearing be held within 60 to 90 days after
services are first offered by the welfare department. He does not favor a prior hearing since
it "would be indistinguishable from the present protective supervision used by the juvenile
court, and would introduce the element of coercion so apt to produce hostility in parents."
Cheney, Safeguarding Legal Rights in Providing Protective Services, CHILDREN, May-June
1966, at 86, 91.
268. Cheney contends that there should be provision for counsel, if requested, at hear-
ings on the continuation of protective services, and that clients should be informed of this
right on the initial contact with them. Id. at 92.
269. See generally Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), where the Supreme Court
found that required visits to welfare recipients' homes were not searches in the traditional
criminal law context, but indicated that home visits may have some of the characteristics of
a traditional search.
270. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-1426 to -1431 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1
(1973).
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dent and neglected children, currently found in three separate chap-
ters"' and overlapping each other considerably, could be consoli-
dated. Hopefully a single definition of neglect would also be part of
the article. Finally, statutory presumptions of prior abuse as evi-
dence of an abusive environment and the child's condition as prima
facie evidence of abuse or neglect must be included as part of a child
protection article.
The law is only one part of the answer to the problem of child
abuse. It is also, by nature usually called in after the damage has
already been done. Recognition of these limitations does not make
the role of the law unimportant, however. It should rather spur all
those involved to make the impact of the law felt most effectively
where it is needed in dealing with child abuse.
271. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-504 to -508 (Repl. 1964), IND. CODE § 12-3-3 (1973); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 9-2806 to -2809 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-5 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
9-3201 to -3224 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 31-5-7 (1973).
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